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Abstract 
Lucas (1988) hypothesised that human capital externalities explain persistent 
productivity growth and become manifest via interactions between workplace 
colleagues. Consistent with the first part of this hypothesis, Fox and Milbourne (2006) 
concluded that an increase in the average level of human capital in Australian 
economics departments raised the research productivity of departmental members. 
This paper tests the robustness of this finding by using a direct, rather than a proxy, 
measure of human capital and confirms the existence of human capital externalities 
within Australian economics departments. But we go further by investigating the 
second part of Lucas’ hypothesis. Whilst there are numerous ways in which 
departmental colleagues may interact, we investigate whether the externality becomes 
manifest via co-authorship. We find no evidence that this type of interaction 




I  Introduction 
Microeconomists have long recognised that externalities affect economic efficiency. 
Over the last 25 years macroeconomists have also developed an interest in 
externalities, in particular because of their potential for explaining persistent 
productivity increases. For example Lucas(1988) hypothesised that, additional to the 
usual inputs (technology, physical and human capital), production also depends on a 
human capital externality, which he modelled as increasing in the average skill level 
of workers. Subsequently, there has been some interest in identifying and quantifying 
human capital externalities within workplaces.  
According to this literature, positive human capital externalities within firms 
may emerge from the creation of a team ethos, from information sharing, from skill 
complementarities, and from informal on-the-job training amongst co-workers. The 
existence of positive human capital externalities is suggested by the clustering of 
highly skilled professionals (and non-professionals) in firms and by team dynamic 
effects in professional sport. Conversely, human capital externalities may be negative 
if over-qualified workers are disruptive or if an excessive variation in human capital 
across workers in a firm creates a skills-incompatibility problem which makes it 
difficult to implement training programs, increases the costs of co-ordination and 
communication or promotes fractionalisation within the workplace. In this latter 
scenario more highly skilled workers may discount the productive potential from 
collaborating with their less skilled colleagues.1
Academics typically possess high levels of human capital which are relatively 
easily identified and so the human capital externality hypothesised by Lucas should be 
measurable within academia. However the literature examining this issue is sparse. 
     
                                                 
1 See, for example, Battu, H., et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of positive and negative human 
capital externalities within workplaces, in this case for Great Britain.  
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Fox and Milbourne (1999) and Rodgers and Neri (2007) both found that the research 
productivity of academic economists in Australia is a function of their human capital 
and characteristics of their departmental environment. Additionally, and of most 
relevance to this study, Fox and Milbourne (2006) found evidence of a positive 
human capital externality within departments. The authors collected survey data from 
134 academics on their human capital and other characteristics, and on the 
institutional environment in which they worked. Human capital data included whether 
the academic had a PhD, the time taken to obtain the PhD and the grade of the 
Honours degree. Institutional data included average teaching hours per week, average 
class size and the average number of research grants held per year since the first 
appointment.  
The authors calculated various proxy measures of the human capital of the co-
workers of the academics who responded to the questionnaire, all based on their 
lifetime research output. These included the average annual research output of the 
most productive individual, of the three most productive individuals and of the most 
productive quartile in the relevant department.2
This study seeks to test the robustness of this conclusion by using a direct, 
rather than a proxy, measure for the human capital of departmental co-workers. 
 The authors concluded, on the basis of 
Tobit regressions, that the coefficient on the proxy for the average human capital in 
one’s department was statistically significant and positive: "...there are human capital 
externalities so that an increase in the human capital of any individual also raises, at 
the margin, the productivity of others. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
externality is driven primarily by having a small but critical mass of researchers, 
rather than one outstanding individual." (p. 369). 
                                                 
2 See Fox and Milbourne (1999) for details on the questionnaire used and the data thereby obtained. 
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Furthermore we test for the existence of a human capital externality for (nearly) all 
Australian academic economists rather than just a self-selected sample who responded 
to a survey. We also examine a different study period. In doing so, we confirm the 
existence of a positive human capital externality within Australian economics 
departments.  
Finally we investigate the nature of the externality, that is, how the externality 
becomes manifest. Lucas (1988) conjectured that "...human capital accumulation is a 
social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the 
accumulation of physical capital" (p.19, italics ours), and that "The external 
effects...have to do with the influences people have on the productivity of others, so 
the scope of such effects must have to do with the ways various groups interact..." 
(p.37, italics ours). In Lucas’ scenario departmental colleagues interact because they 
believe that such interactions are subject to increasing returns.3
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we 
present and discuss our data. In section III we estimate an econometric model of the 
relationship between research productivity and a vector of human capital and other 
 Of course workplace 
interactions take many forms, most of which are not directly observable. However 
departmental co-authorship, which may be regarded as a strong form of workplace 
interaction, is both observable and measurable. Indeed in at least one department of 
which we are aware research incentive schemes have been established to encourage 
such collaboration. Hence a second objective of this study is to estimate the 
relationship between academic economists’ research productivity, the average human 
capital of the academics’ departmental colleagues, and the academics’ propensity to 
co-author with departmental colleagues.  
                                                 




variables, including the propensity of each individual academic to co-author with a 
departmental colleague. Finally, section IV concludes.   
 
II Data4
We identified all academics at the level of Lecturer (Level B) and above in 28 
research active Australian economics departments during the period 1996-2000 and 
constructed a dataset of their research productivity and human capital.
 
5 We adjusted 
for publication time lags by assuming that a given publication was produced within 
the department stated in the affiliation if and only if the authors were members of the 
department two years prior to the publication year. However we classified 
publications as departmentally co-authored only if at least two of the co-authors 
appeared on one of our departmental staff lists.6
We counted only refereed journal publications because we are interested in 
research of a minimum level of quality (Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole, 2003).
  
7
                                                 
4  See Neri and Rodgers (2006) and Rodgers and Neri (2007) for more details on data sources and 
construction methods. 
 Our 
major source of publications data was the on-line version of EconLit. This database is 
not without limitations (Pomfret and Wang, 2003), a major one being that articles 
with several authors are frequently referenced using the ‘et al.’ convention. 
Consequently relevant articles will be missed unless the first author is included in our 
staff list and a supplementary search is undertaken to reveal the other authors, a 
practice which we followed in every case. Each of n authors received credit for 1/n of 
the article.  
5 We excluded the following universities because of data limitations: Charles Darwin, Charles Sturt, 
Swinburne University of Technology, Southern Cross and the University of Southern Queensland. 
6 In cases where a co-author had an Australian economics department affiliation but did not appear on 
our staff list, we assumed the person to be a student or academic from another department or research 
centre within the same university.   
7 This is supported by research suggesting that the returns to non-refereed publications are low, at least 
in other countries. See Gibson (2000) and Sauer (1988). 
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We calculated departmental research productivity as the weighted average of 
the research productivities of its members, the weights being the number of years each 
member was in the department from 1996 to 2000. We assumed that longer articles 
imply a larger research output and so we took page counts but adjusted these for 
differences in the mean number of words or characters per page.8 Any meaningful 
measure of departmental research productivity must also take account of journal 
quality which is particularly relevant here because co-authorship may be more 
common where colleagues attempt to publish in top tier journals. However, measuring 
journal quality is problematic.9
Consequently we used two versions of our dataset on departmental research 
productivity. The first (which we term Q1) uses the impact factors for only the top 
159 journals from Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003). Ipso facto, this 
approach disregards publications in many other journals which are of insufficient 
quality. As relatively few Australian academic economists publish in top tier journals, 
and as we believe that an article in a refereed journal is better than no article at all, we 
also used the complete dataset (termed Q2) which includes a much broader range of 
journals based on information from Gibson (2000) and Towe and Wright (1995). 
Whilst there is likely to be disagreement over these journal lists and the quality 
relativities, any weighting scheme is to a greater or lesser extent ad hoc, and in any 
case our approach is explicit and replicable using alternate weights. Table 1 presents 
   
                                                 
8 Our analysis is based on ‘standardised’ pages calculated with page-conversion factors for 391 journals 
provided to us by Sinha and Macri (2002). For other journals we used the average conversion factor of 
all 'group 4 journals' in Sinha and Macri (2002). The reference journal, with a weight of one, is the 
American Economic Review. 
9 See Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole (2003), Figure 1 for an illustrative summary of the wide range of 
weighting schemes used in the literature to take account of journal quality. See also Combes and 
Linnemer (2003), Lubrano et al. (2003), Axarlaglou and Theoharakis (2003),  Mason, Steagall and 




(alphabetically) our departmental data on research productivity and on the percentage 
of that research output that was co-authored by (at least two) departmental colleagues. 
 
 
Table 1: Research Productivity and Co-authorship, 1998-2002 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Adelaide 50 0.40 0.20 2.6 65 2.05 1.34 2.5 
ADFA 28 0.05 0.01 33.4 35 0.52 0.08 29.5 
ANU 83 0.80 0.66 11.8 86 2.01 1.73 14.6 
Canberra 17 0.00 0.00 0.0 25 0.19 0.05 11.8 
Curtin 54 0.14 0.07 12.0 82 0.97 0.77 11.6 
Deakin 43 0.18 0.08 6.1 59 1.27 0.76 14.2 
E.Cowan 7 0.03 0.00 0.0 13 0.64 0.08 0.0 
Flinders 30 0.26 0.08 9.4 30 2.37 0.72 11.8 
Griffith 21 0.03 0.01 0.0 64 0.28 0.18 8.7 
JCU 19 2.68 0.50 0.0 34 5.40 1.86 0.0 
LaTrobe 58 0.25 0.15 17.2 68 1.74 1.18 13.0 
Macquarie 14 0.07 0.01 1.6 41 0.72 0.29 3.7 
Melbourne 72 0.55 0.40 6.5 87 3.18 2.77 14.4 
Monash 40 0.48 0.19 1.1 54 1.34 0.73 11.4 
Murdoch 25 0.03 0.01 0.0 55 1.31 0.72 16.9 
NewEng. 62 0.08 0.05 34.8 86 0.50 0.44 6.9 
Newcastle 13 0.04 0.01 0.0 59 0.35 0.21 12.1 
NSW 55 0.69 0.38 12.0 69 2.24 1.55 10.8 
QLD 39 0.08 0.03 0.0 77 1.07 0.83 7.5 
QUT 13 0.10 0.01 0.0 35 0.78 0.28 18.6 
RMIT 19 0.03 0.01 22.9 30 1.08 0.32 73.9 
Sydney 32 0.13 0.04 0.9 66 0.80 0.52 0.4 
Tasmania 69 0.24 0.17 6.1 81 2.69 2.18 12.5 
UTS 13 0.22 0.03 33.3 49 0.40 0.20 36.3 
VUT 12 0.05 0.01 74.5 28 0.38 0.11 61.1 
W Aust 58 1.14 0.66 0.8 70 3.08 2.15 1.3 
W Sydney 29 0.08 0.02 0.0 53 0.64 0.33 2.3 
W’gong 15 0.06 0.01 64.6 61 0.53 0.32 24.2 
         




Column 2 of Table 1 shows the percentage of academics, department by 
department, with some Q1 publications during the study period. Because many 
academics in many departments did not publish at all, we present in Column 3 the Q1 
research productivities of the subset of academics in each department who had 
positive publications. Column 4 contains departmental Q1 research productivities for 
all academics, which range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 0.66 pages per 
person year. Whilst for all departments the productivity figures are much higher for 
the research active than for all members, in some cases by as much as sevenfold (e.g. 
Macquarie and UTS), the data nevertheless highlight the fact that the large majority of 
Australian academic economists have low research productivity by international 
standards during the study period. Column 5 of Table 1 contains the proportions of the 
departmental Q1 outputs that were co-authored with departmental colleagues and the 
range is again very wide, from a minimum of zero percent to a maximum of 74.5%.  
Columns 6-9 of Table 1 contain the corresponding data for Q2 publications. 
Departments are more productive in terms of Q2 publications, with productivity of the 
research-active ranging from 0.19 to 5.40 pages per person per year (Column 7) and 
that of all members ranging from 0.05 to 2.77 (Column 8).  Finally Column 9 contains 
the respective proportions co-authored by colleagues, the range being very similar to 
that for Q1 productivity.  
Table 1 makes clear the fact that research productivity, whether measured for a 
restricted or a much broader collection of journals, was low on average across all 
departments and was driven in most departments by a relatively small group of active 
researchers. These data also suggest that attitudes or traditions towards co-authoring 
with colleagues within departments varied greatly. In some departments, as much as 
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75% of all journal articles were authored by departmental colleagues. In other 
departments, such collaboration was simply non-existent.   
Of particular interest to us is whether departmental co-authorship, which can 
be regarded as a (strong) form of workplace collaboration, is positively related to 
research productivity. The last row of Columns 5 and 9 in Table 1 contains the simple 
correlation coefficients between, respectively, Q1 and Q2 departmental research 
productivities and the relevant proportions co-authored. In both cases there is a weak 
negative correlation between these two variables. Thus the research externalities 
identified by Fox and Milbourne are not manifest via co-authorship between 
departmental colleagues, at least not in simple correlations based on department-level 
data. In the next section we investigate this hypothesis using partial correlations based 
on data at the level of the individual.  
  
III A model of research productivity 
In this section we investigate the existence and nature of the human capital externality 
identified by Fox and Milbourne (2006) by estimating a model of the determinants of 
research productivity using data for individual academics. As a substantial proportion 
of academic economists in our data set have zero publications, we use a Tobit (Type 
I) model which allows for corner solutions. Equation (1) states the hypothesis that 
research output is related to human capital, research experience, a human capital 
externality, and some control variables as follows. 
log(output) = max [lower limit,  β0 + β1phd1 + β2phd2 + β3phd3  + β4exp + 
β5(phd1*exp) + β6(phd2*exp) + β7gender + β8prof + β9aspro +β10resuni 





The lower limit is set just below the logarithm of the smallest positive research output 
in the data set (see Cameron and Trevedi, 2009, Section 16.4.2).10 The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of research output because, unlike research output itself, the 
logarithm is approximately normally distributed over strictly positive output values 
(see Appendix 1).  The error term, u, represents unobservable influences on output 
and is, by assumption, independent of the explanatory variables and Normal(0,σ2
Human capital is represented by three dummy variables, phd1, phd2 and phd3, 
which equal one if, in the first year between 1996 and 2000 that the individual was 
employed in a given department, he or she had a PhD from an institution ranked 1-50, 
51-150 or ≥151, respectively (in descending order of quality).
)  
11
Several control variables are also included in the model. The binary variable 
gender, which equals one if female, controls for any productivity differences between 
male and female academic economists. Two binary variables attempt to control for 
research ability and ambition to climb the academic ladder: prof, which equals one if 
the individual was a professor when first observed in the department, and aspro which 
equals one if the individual was an associate professor when first observed and was 
  Experience, exp, is the 
number of years between when the PhD was conferred and the last year between 1996 
and 2000 that the individual was employed in the given economics department. 
Individuals without a PhD have exp set equal to zero; they constitute the benchmark 
category to which others are compared. The two interaction terms allow experience to 
have a differential effect on research output, depending on the quality of the PhD.  
                                                 
10 The Tobit I model assumes that each explanatory variable has the same effect on the probability of 
publishing as on the (log of the) number of pages published, given some publications were achieved. 
We checked this following the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2009, p.595). A Probit model with 
the same explanatory variables was estimated and found to have coefficients with the same sign and of 
approximately the same magnitude as those of the Tobit I model. 
11 We used the rankings of PhD granting institutions in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003).  See Rodgers and 
Neri (2007) for more details.  
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awarded a PhD no more than ten years earlier. The binary variable resuni, which equals 
one if the individual is employed in a research-intensive university, takes account of 
broad institutional differences that might affect research productivity.12 The variable, 
size, is the average number of academics in the department during the period 1996 
through 2002. It is included to control for the effect of departmental scale on research 
productivity and on the propensity to co-author.13
Two versions of the model were estimated using the method of maximum 
likelihood: one with productivity measured in Q1-pages per year, the other with 
productivity measured in Q2-pages per year. The estimated coefficients in several 
specifications of each version of the model, and their levels of significance are 
displayed in Appendix 2 . All coefficients have the expected signs and most are 
statistically significant. Given the nonlinear nature of the Tobit model, the average 
partial effects (APEs) of the explanatory variables are of more interest than the 
coefficients. The APEs on the expected productivity of all economists are given in 
Table 2 for Q1 output and Table 3 for Q2 output.
  
14
With the exception of the variable resuni, the APEs are approximately constant 
across the various specifications of the model. The APEs of the three human capital 
variables, phd1, phd2 and phd3, indicate that having a PhD is very important for 
research productivity, particularly a PhD from a top 50 university in the case of Q1 
publications. For example, the APEs of phd1, 3.300 and 1.995 in Tables 2 and 3 (Row  
 
 
                                                 
12 The research intensive universities in our study are Adelaide, ANU, Melbourne, Monash, New South 
Wales, Queensland, Sydney, Tasmania and Western Australia.  
13 The inclusion of the variable size takes account of the fact that large departments offer more 
opportunity for co-authoring than small departments. If productivity is inversely related to department 
size ceteris paribus, and if more co-authoring occurs in large departments than in small departments, 
then excluding size would create a downward bias in the estimated effect of co-authoring. 
14 The APEs of the explanatory variables on the productivity of those economists who have some 
publications are given in Appendix 2. As expected they are larger than the APEs of the explanatory 




Table 2: Average Partial Effects on the log of Q1 Research Productivity of All Academics 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 3.300 0.000 2.956 0.000 3.071 0.000 2.892 0.000 3.301 0.000 2.961 0.000 
phd2 2.274 0.000 2.125 0.000 2.228 0.000 2.135 0.000 2.280 0.000 2.125 0.000 
phd3 2.124 0.000 2.149 0.000 2.134 0.000 2.141 0.000 2.151 0.000 2.165 0.000 
exp -0.050 0.000 -0.053 0.000 -0.047 0.000 -0.052 0.000 -0.051 0.000 -0.054 0.000 
gender -0.537 0.020 -0.513 0.019 -0.483 0.028 -0.476 0.033 -0.526 0.025 -0.506 0.023 
prof 1.595 0.000 1.672 0.000 1.560 0.000 1.655 0.000 1.624 0.000 1.693 0.000 
aspro 0.840 0.129 0.769 0.125 0.792 0.129 0.752 0.132 0.848 0.125 0.770 0.123 
resuni 1.173 0.001 0.217 0.522 0.583 0.081 0.103 0.729 1.343 0.000 0.348 0.350 
size -0.017 0.215 -0.024 0.035 -0.010 0.382 -0.018 0.104 -0.023 0.110 -0.028 0.020 
hc1_coll   0.044 0.003   0.033 0.040          0.045 0.002 
hc2_coll   0.027 0.083   0.028 0.043   0.025 0.079 
hc3_coll   0.010 0.254   0.011 0.162   0.010 0.241 
pub_coll     2.228 0.000 1.250 0.129     
co-author         0.007 0.438 0.006 0.473 







Table 3: Average Partial Effects on the log of Q2 Research Productivity of All Academics 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 1.995 0.000 1.846 0.000 1.895 0.000 1.817 0.000 1.974 0.000 1.852 0.000 
phd2 1.442 0.000 1.372 0.000 1.407 0.000 1.372 0.000 1.430 0.000 1.377 0.000 
phd3 1.188 0.000 1.148 0.000 1.182 0.000 1.144 0.000 1.174 0.000 1.161 0.000 
exp -0.024 0.000 -0.026 0.000 -0.022 0.001 -0.025 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.026 0.000 
gender -0.302 0.013 -0.281 0.015 -0.294 0.017 -0.273 0.022 -0.302 0.013 -0.274 0.019 
prof 0.840 0.000 0.873 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.858 0.000 0.842 0.000 0.880 0.000 
aspro 0.510 0.026 0.444 0.039 0.489 0.031 0.438 0.046 0.508 0.026 0.425 0.050 
resuni 0.542 0.005 0.164 0.334 0.294 0.114 0.125 0.363 0.479 0.027 0.184 0.259 
size -0.003 0.632 -0.003 0.564 -0.001 0.870 0.000 0.957 -0.001 0.887 -0.008 0.110 
hc1_coll   0.017 0.033   0.010 0.142          0.022 0.003 
hc2_coll   0.015 0.086   0.016 0.027   0.019 0.022 
hc3_coll   0.012 0.002   0.012 0.001   0.017 0.000 
pub_coll     0.253 0.007 0.170 0.194     
co-author                -0.004 0.353 0.008 0.030 




1) respectively, imply that an economist with a PhD from a top 50 university has 
expected research productivity that is (e3.300 =) 27 times larger in the case of Q1 
publications, and (e1.995
There is a statistically significant difference between the effects of phd1 and 
phd2 and also between phd1 and phd3 on the production of Q1 publications.  For 
example, compared with an economist with a PhD from an institution ranked 51-150, 
an economist with a PhD from a top 50 institution is predicted to have (e
 =) 7.4 times larger in the case of Q2 publications, than that of 
an economist without a PhD. These are large effects, but given the median number of 
Q1 pages per year is zero and the median number of Q2 pages per year is 0.041 (see 
Appendix 1) they are not unreasonably large.  
(3.300-2.274)
Productivity declines with the years since the PhD was awarded, by about five 
per cent per year in the case of Q1 publications and a little more than two per cent per 
year for Q2 publications. The APE of gender implies that the Q1 and Q2 productivity 
of females is about (e
 =) 
2.8 times more Q1 research output per annum. However, the difference between the 
effect of phd2 and phd3 on Q1 productivity is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications of the model. On the other hand, there are no statistically significant 
differences among the effects of phd1, phd2 and phd3 on Q2 research productivity.   
-0.537 =) 0.6 and (e-0.302 =) 0.7, respectively, that of males. The 
control variables, prof and aspro, indicate that academic status when first observed in 
the data set is directly related to productivity during the following years. Compared 
with other academic economists, professors are (e1.595 =) 4.9 and (e0.840 =) 2.3 times 
more productive in Q1 and Q2 publications, respectively; ‘fast-track’ associate 
professors are (e0.840 =) 2.3 and (e0.510=) 1.7 times more productive, although the former 
is not statistically significant. The size of the economics department, size, has no 
15 
 
statistically significant effect on Q2 research productivity and has a small, negative, but 
only marginally significant, effect on Q1 research productivity. The APE of working in 
a research-intensive university is highly significant in Specification 1, suggesting that 
academic economists at research-intensive universities produce (e1.173 =) 3.2 times more 
Q1 pages per year, and (e0.542
We now turn our attention to the existence of a human capital externality. Fox 
and Milbourne (2006) found that the research productivity of economists who 
responded to their survey increased with a proxy measure of the human capital of their 
departmental colleagues, namely their lifetime annual productivity. By contrast we use 
direct measures of human capital. In Tables 2 and 3, Specification 2, the externality is 
measured using three variables: the percentage of one’s departmental colleagues who 
have a PhD from a top 50 university (hc1_coll), from a university ranked 51-150 
(hc2_coll) and from a university of lower rank (hc3_coll).
 =) 1.7 times more Q2 pages per year, than other 
economists. However, in most other specifications the APE of resuni is much smaller 
and not statistically significant, the interpretation of which is explored below.  
15
There is also a statistically significant positive human-capital externality in the 
production of Q2 research output although its size is quite small and varies little with 
 For Q1 productivity, 
having colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university creates a positive externality:  a 
one percentage point increase in the percentage of one’s colleagues with a PhD from a 
top 50 university increases one’s own productivity by 4.4 per cent. The APE of 
hc2_coll is about half that size (2.7 per cent) and is statistically significant only at the 
ten per cent level. The APE of hc3_coll is even smaller and not statistically significant. 
This indicates that the externality is driven primarily by the most highly qualified 
subset of one’s colleagues.  
                                                 
15 The residual category is the proportion of one’s co-workers without a PhD. 
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the origin of the PhD: a one percentage point increase in the percentage of one’s 
colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university increases one’s own Q2 productivity by 
1.7 per cent while the APEs of hc2_coll and hc3_coll are 1.5 per cent and 1.2 per cent, 
respectively. All these effects are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level and 
two of them are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.  
The APE of working in a research-intensive university, which is large and 
highly significant in Specification 1, declines substantially in size and becomes 
statistically non-significant once the human-capital of departmental colleagues is 
included in the model. This suggests that resuni in Specification 1 is capturing the 
propensity of research-intensive universities to hire well trained academics; beyond that 
their effect on research productivity is little different to that of other universities.  
Next, we consider an alternative, indirect measure of the externality, namely, 
the contemporaneous, rather than lifetime, productivity of co-workers, which is 
measured by the variable pub_coll.  Unlike the Fox and Milbourne (2006) analysis, 
the use of pub_coll assumes that for a research externality to exist between two 
academic economists, the two people must be present in the same department during 
the same period of time. When pub_coll  replaces hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll in 
Specification 2 of Tables 2 and 3 we get Specification 3. The APE of pub_coll on Q1 
productivity is large and highly significant: a one-page increase per annum in the Q1 
output of departmental colleagues is associated with a 222.8 per cent increase in the 
individual’s Q1 productivity. Once again, to put this in perspective keep in mind that 
on average academics have Q1 productivity of only 0.144 pages per annum and more 
than 50 per cent of academics have no Q1 output at all. The APE of pub_coll on Q2 
productivity is smaller, though still statistically significant: a one-page increase per 
annum in the contemporaneous Q2 output of departmental colleagues is associated 
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with a 25.3 per cent increase in the individual’s Q2 productivity. The mean and 
median Q2 productivities of all academic economists in the data set are 0.807 and 
0.041 pages per annum, respectively, which makes the APE of pub_coll a modest 
increase. This result implies that individuals with contemporaneously highly research-
active co-workers are more productive, ceteris paribus, than individuals with 
colleagues who are less contemporaneously research active. This result also confirms 
the conclusion of Fox and Milbourne (2006), which is based on lifetime research 
output per year. 
When pub_coll as well as hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll are all included in the 
model, as in Specification 4, the APE of pub_coll on both Q1 and Q2 productivity is 
much reduced in magnitude compared with Specification 3 and is no longer statistically 
significant. There is evidently a positive relationship between the human capital and the 
research productivity of one’s departmental co-workers because the APE of hc1_coll on 
both Q1 and Q2 productivity becomes smaller, and the latter is no longer significantly 
different from zero. However, the APEs of hc2_coll and hc3_coll on both Q1 and Q2 
productivity are little changed in Specification 4 compared with Specification 2. 
Although these results reinforce the conclusion of Fox and Milbourne (2006) that the 
externality is associated with the extent to which one’s departmental colleagues are 
research active, the direct measure of the human capital of colleagues is better able to 
explain research productivity than the indirect measure.  
 Finally, we turn to the question of whether the human-capital externality 
becomes manifest via co-authoring. In Tables 2 and 3, Specification 5,  the variables 
pub_coll, hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll in Specification 4 are replaced by the 
variable co-author, which is the percentage of each department’s published pages that 
involve co-authoring with at least one colleague from the same department. We find no 
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evidence that co-authoring affects research productivity. To the contrary, the APE of 
co-authoring on both Q1 and Q2 publications is very small and not remotely 
statistically significant. The APEs of the other explanatory variables are approximately 
the same as in Specification 2, with the exception of resuni, which is larger and 
marginally statistically significant.
Specification 6 includes both co-author and the human-capital measures. The 
APE effect of co-author on Q1 productivity remains small and statistically non-
significant, as it was in Specification 5. The APEs of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll 
on Q1 productivity retain approximately the same magnitudes and levels of significance 
as in Specification 2. These outcomes suggest there is little relationship between the 
propensity to co-author and the human capital of one’s colleagues. However, the 
situation is a little different with respect to Q2 productivity where the APE effect of co-
author remains small but becomes positive and statistically significant at the five per 
cent level. Also, the APEs of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll on Q2 productivity 
increase slightly and become more statistically significant in Specification 6 compared 
with Specification 2. This is consistent with a negative correlation between the human-
capital of one’s departmental colleagues and the extent of co-authoring within a 
department, This is the only result in support of the hypothesis that co-authorship 
enhances research productivity, although the effect is small, a one percentage point 
increase in the percentage of departmental output that is co-authored increases one’s 




This study investigated whether a human capital externality boosted the 
research productivity of academics in Australian economics departments from 1996 to 
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2000, as measured by the number of pages published per year in scholarly journals. 
We extended the work of Fox and Milbourne (2006) by using a direct, rather than an 
indirect, measure of the human capital of one’s departmental colleagues. Doing so, we 
conclude that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of departmental 
colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university increases the individual’s productivity 
by between two and four per cent on average, depending upon the quality of the 
journal outlet. We also found that the contemporaneous productivity of co-workers 
had a large effect on the individual’s productivity, which supports the Fox and 
Milbourne (2006) assertion that the externality is associated with the extent to which 
one’s departmental colleagues are research active. However, once we controlled for 
their educational qualifications the contemporaneous productivity effect was no 
longer apparent. 
The way in which the externality becomes manifest remains unclear but, after 
controlling for other factors, we find no evidence that it does so via departmental co-
authoring. Whilst there may be other reasons for encouraging collaboration between 
colleagues, this finding casts doubt on the efficacy of departmental research incentive 
schemes which seek to encourage co-authorship as a way of boosting research 
productivity.  
It is possible that co-authoring is a response to workplace conditions or 
personal attributes that have a negative effect on productivity and which, not being 
included in the model, impart a negative bias to our measure of the effect of co-
authoring on productivity. On the other hand, there are mechanisms other than co-
authoring that are consistent with the existence of a human capital externality. For 
example, there may be demonstration effects, peer pressure effects or competition to 
out-publish one’s colleagues among academics with high levels of human capital. 
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Alternatively there may be a weaker form of cooperative interaction where people 
contribute to each other’s research output without requiring ‘payment’ in the form of 
co-authorship. Sorting out these influences remains a topic for further research. 
A related question, which we do not investigate here, is whether the wide 
disparities in co-authorship rates across departments observed in the late 1990s have 
persisted in the decade since 2000 when research has become increasingly important 
to career advancement and, if so, why such large differences exist in what might be 
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Q1_pages 871 0.144 0.582 0 7.511 0 7.095 63.890 
Q2_pages 871 0.807 2.009 0 27.244 0.041 5.357 48.070 
ln(Q1_pg) 290 -2.586 2.298 -9.210 2.016 -1.284 -0.693 3.354 
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Tobit Estimation of the log of Q1 Research Productivity 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 13.004 0.000 11.753 0.000 12.168 0.000 11.514 0.000 12.990 0.000 11.746 0.000 
phd2 9.582 0.000 9.058 0.000 9.390 0.000 9.073 0.000 9.603 0.000 9.060 0.000 
phd3 8.713 0.000 8.704 0.000 8.635 0.000 8.641 0.000 8.826 0.000 8.770 0.000 
exp -0.111 0.018 -0.133 0.002 -0.106 0.033 -0.129 0.005 -0.115 0.011 -0.136 0.002 
exp*phd1 -0.161 0.026 -0.115 0.092 -0.137 0.049 -0.110 0.108 -0.154 0.030 -0.110 0.105 
exp*phd2 -0.050 0.493 -0.047 0.508 -0.056 0.439 -0.050 0.477 -0.047 0.521 -0.045 0.529 
gender -1.867 0.031 -1.774 0.032 -1.663 0.043 -1.635 0.050 -1.825 0.038 -1.746 0.037 
prof 4.534 0.000 4.697 0.000 4.422 0.000 4.647 0.000 4.603 0.000 4.744 0.000 
aspro 2.602 0.085 2.396 0.087 2.452 0.090 2.343 0.095 2.625 0.081 2.399 0.086 
resuni 3.814 0.001 0.712 0.528 1.905 0.092 0.336 0.732 4.348 0.000 1.142 0.359 
size -0.057 0.227 -0.078 0.039 -0.033 0.387 -0.057 0.106 -0.074 0.121 -0.092 0.022 
hc1_coll   0.146 0.002   0.109 0.036   0.149 0.001 
hc2_coll   0.090 0.090   0.093 0.046   0.082 0.085 
hc3_coll   0.031 0.255   0.037 0.162   0.033 0.240 
pub_coll             7.294 0.000 4.092 0.131             
co-author                                0.024 0.436 0.021 0.473 
constant -17.678 0.000 -20.88 0.000 -18.453 0.000 -21.365 0.000 -17.827 0.000 -21.009 0.000 
sigma 6.612 0.000 6.434 0.000 6.494 0.000 6.405 0.000 6.601 0.000 6.425 0.000 
log-like’d -1216.1 -1200.6 -1207.6 -1198.7 
 
-1215.4 -1200.1 
Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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Appendix 2 continued 
Tobit Estimation of the log of Q2 Research Productivity 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 5.604 0.000 5.183 0.000 5.349 0.000 5.116 0.000 5.552 0.000 5.181 0.000 
phd2 4.295 0.000 4.087 0.000 4.187 0.000 4.072 0.000 4.261 0.000 4.098 0.000 
phd3 3.319 0.000 3.174 0.000 3.265 0.000 3.152 0.000 3.277 0.000 3.209 0.000 
exp -0.017 0.384 -0.026 0.175 -0.015 0.468 -0.024 0.222 -0.018 0.349 -0.026 0.176 
exp*phd1 -0.098 0.000 -0.084 0.000 -0.092 0.000 -0.084 0.001 -0.097 0.000 -0.082 0.001 
exp*phd2 -0.053 0.024 -0.052 0.023 -0.053 0.024 -0.052 0.024 -0.054 0.024 -0.051 0.023 
gender -0.728 0.020 -0.672 0.021 -0.705 0.023 -0.650 0.029 -0.728 0.018 -0.654 0.027 
prof 1.721 0.000 1.772 0.000 1.664 0.000 1.743 0.000 1.724 0.000 1.782 0.000 
aspro 1.106 0.016 0.969 0.029 1.059 0.021 0.956 0.034 1.102 0.017 0.930 0.038 
resuni 1.231 0.004 0.374 0.334 0.670 0.114 0.286 0.365 1.091 0.023 0.420 0.260 
size -0.008 0.633 -0.007 0.564 -0.002 0.871 -0.001 0.957 -0.003 0.887 -0.017 0.108 
hc1_coll          0.038 0.027   0.023 0.139          0.050 0.002 
hc2_coll          0.035 0.094          0.036 0.029   0.043 0.026 
hc3_coll          0.027 0.002          0.027 0.001          0.038 0.000 
pub_coll            0.581 0.007 0.390 0.190            
co-author                       -0.008 0.349 0.018 0.029 
constant -6.086 0.000 -7.760 0.000 -6.428 0.000 -7.907 0.000 -5.983 0.000 -8.581 0.000 
sigma 2.799 0.000 2.764 0.000 2.775 0.000 2.755 0.000 2.798 0.000 2.756 0.000 
log-like’d -1363.5 -1352.6 -1358.6 -1351.1 
 
-1362.8 -1350.6 




Average Partial Effects on the log of Q1 Research Productivity of Academics with Some Publications  
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 3.836 0.000 3.351 0.000 3.528 0.000 3.268 0.000 3.827 0.000 3.351 0.000 
phd2 2.417 0.000 2.231 0.000 2.371 0.000 2.250 0.000 2.416 0.000 2.226 0.000 
phd3 2.212 0.000 2.260 0.000 2.241 0.000 2.255 0.000 2.240 0.000 2.275 0.000 
exp -0.063 0.000 -0.066 0.000 -0.059 0.000 -0.064 0.000 -0.064 0.000 -0.066 0.000 
gender -0.629 0.016 -0.602 0.015 -0.565 0.023 -0.558 0.027 -0.616 0.020 -0.593 0.018 
prof 2.009 0.000 2.097 0.000 1.954 0.000 2.071 0.000 2.046 0.000 2.122 0.000 
aspro 1.034 0.145 0.941 0.136 0.969 0.143 0.918 0.144 1.044 0.141 0.941 0.135 
resuni 1.428 0.001 0.261 0.521 0.703 0.077 0.123 0.729 1.636 0.000 0.420 0.348 
size -0.021 0.209 -0.029 0.034 -0.012 0.379 -0.021 0.102 -0.027 0.105 -0.034 0.020 
hc1_coll   0.053 0.004   0.040 0.043          0.054 0.002 
hc2_coll   0.033 0.083   0.034 0.044   0.030 0.079 
hc3_coll   0.012 0.256   0.013 0.165   0.012 0.243 
pub_coll     2.664 0.000 1.497 0.128     
intra                0.009 0.439 0.008 0.473 
Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
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Appendix 3 continued 
Average Partial Effects on the log of Q2 Research Productivity of Academics with Some Publications  
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value 
phd1 2.650 0.000 2.447 0.000 2.517 0.000 2.408 0.000 2.623 0.000 2.452 0.000 
phd2 1.915 0.000 1.816 0.000 1.867 0.000 1.817 0.000 1.900 0.000 1.820 0.000 
phd3 1.564 0.000 1.509 0.000 1.556 0.000 1.503 0.000 1.546 0.000 1.524 0.000 
exp -0.031 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.033 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.034 0.000 
gender -0.393 0.013 -0.365 0.015 -0.381 0.016 -0.353 0.021 -0.393 0.012 -0.355 0.019 
prof 1.095 0.000 1.131 0.000 1.056 0.000 1.111 0.000 1.097 0.000 1.138 0.000 
aspro 0.668 0.025 0.578 0.038 0.638 0.030 0.570 0.045 0.665 0.025 0.553 0.048 
resuni 0.715 0.005 0.213 0.338 0.386 0.117 0.163 0.366 0.632 0.028 0.240 0.263 
size -0.005 0.632 -0.004 0.564 -0.001 0.870 0.000 0.957 -0.001 0.887 -0.010 0.110 
hc1_coll   0.022 0.032   0.013 0.141          0.029 0.003 
hc2_coll   0.020 0.086   0.020 0.027   0.024 0.022 
hc3_coll   0.015 0.002   0.015 0.001   0.022 0.000 
pub_coll     0.329 0.007 0.221 0.194     
intra                 -0.005 0.354 0.010 0.030 
Standard errors are cluster-robust, where the clustering is by department. 
 
